Volume 13
Issue 1 Winter 1973
Winter 1973

Information Generation and Communication to Establish
Environmental Quality Objectives
Irving K. Fox
Lyman F. Wible

Recommended Citation
Irving K. Fox & Lyman F. Wible, Information Generation and Communication to Establish Environmental
Quality Objectives, 13 Nat. Resources J. 134 (1973).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol13/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

INFORMATION GENERATION AND
COMMUNICATION TO ESTABLISH
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY OBJECTIVES*
IRVING K. FOX** AND LYMAN F. WIBLE***

It is now generally accepted that some uses of natural resources
have side effects which adversely alter the quality of the physical and
biological environment and that public action is necessary to weigh
these effects and determine to what extent they are worthwhile in
view of the benefits society derives from such uses. Four broad
categories of public procedures are utilized for this purpose.
One such category entails the evaluation of the consequences of
individual actions at the time the action is proposed and determines
whether the result will be socially optimal in view of the estimated
effects upon environmental quality. The requirement of federal law
that environmental impact statements be prepared and considered
before certain kinds of activities are undertaken is the latest
procedure of this kind.
A second category of procedures involves limiting or constraining
certain kinds of activities that are viewed as adversely affecting
environmental quality. Thus with regard to air and water, effluent
standards have been widely utilized. Legislation or regulations may
specify the quantities of particulate matter and certain chemicals
permissible in stack emissions. Frequently the standard is specified
in terms of the technology to be applied-such as secondary treatment
of sewage. In uban communities the fencing of lots and the planting of
shrubbery above a certain height along lot lines may be prohibited
and so on.
A third category of procedures involves deciding upon the design of
an environment and requiring that future actions be consistent with
that design. This is the procedure followed when a master plan is
developed for a park or urban community and zoning ordinances are
adopted to assure adherence to the master plan.
Closely related to this third category of procedures is a fourth
which involves the establishment of environmental quality standards
or objectives and then limiting activities so as to assure realization of
the standards. Most students of air and water quality management
*This paper is based on two studies that were supported by the Office of Water Resources
Research, under Agreement -Nos. 14-01-001-1601 and 14-31-001-3352, and the National Water
Commission, Contract No. N.W.S.-71-014.
* Westwatee Research Centre, The University of British Columbia, Canada.
* Department of Natural Resources, State of Wisconsin, U.S.A.
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consider this to be the preferred procedure for these resources.1 It is
widely accepted that ambient air and water quality standards or
objectives should be established and programs of air and water use
designed to realize the standards. This procedure requires first the
specification of the air or water quality characteristics to be achieved.
For water these might include the minimum level of dissolved
oxygen, the permissible coliforr count and the permissible nutrient
concentration. This specification of standards must be followed by
programs of resource use and waste disposal that result in realization
of the standards. It is this category of procedures that is considered in
this article.
Air and water quality objectives or standards are determined
through two different but related public processes. One is legislative,
involving decisions by publicly elected representatives in Congress,
state legislatures, or local legislative bodies. The other process is
administrative, involving decisions by executive or regulatory agencies operating in accord with procedures usually prescribed by law. It
should be kept in mind that the same piece of legislation may
approach a pollution problem in several different ways. It may
establish effluent standards by specifying the technologies of waste
treatment that will be required. It may go a long way toward
specifying ambient air or water quality standards that must be met
by, for example, requiring that water quality be such as not to harm
fish life. It may specify adminstrative procedures for establishing
either effluent or ambient standards.
This paper is concerned with the establishment of ambient
standards through administrative procedures. It undertakes the
review of a specific case in which water quality objectives were
administratively determined and evaluates the results of this process.
This evaluation is based on the premise that when an ambient air or
water quality standard is established through public decision-making
processes, society is, in effect, deciding that ahigher standard is not
worth the cost of realizing it and that a lower standard would result in
damages that can be avoided at a cost that is less than the damages. In
short, the establishment of standards presumes a weighing of benefits
and costs and the selection of a standard that will achieve a social
2
optimum.
Much of the literature on water quality management makes the
1. For a discussion of the use of ambient standards for water quality management see A.
Kneese & B. Bower, Managing Water Quality: Economics, Technology, Institutions 131-34
(1968). For a general discussion of the use of standards see Fox, The Use of Standards in
Achieving Appropriate Levels of Tolerance, 67 Proc. of Nat'l Acad. of Sci. 877-86 (1970).
2. A. Kneese & B. Bower, id. at 131-132.
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tacit assumption that the establishment of ambient air and water
quality standards is a relatively unimportant part of the total process
of water quality management. 3 Emphasis is placed instead upon the
process of achieving the standards. It is accepted that standards will
be determined by a rather crude benefit-cost assessment to which
little importance is attached.
The underlying reasoning appears to be that since it is difficult if
not impossible to secure the information, and especially quantifiable
information, this part of the process is not very important. This is an
odd position for economists, in particular, to take because a least cost
system for achieving the wrong result can hardly be considered an
efficient solution. 4 The view underlying this paper is that the
specification of ambient standards is an important part of the process
of achieving optimal air and water quality conditions.
In considering the matter of establishing standards it must be
recognized that it is impracticable to secure the necessary information and measure effects so as to determine analytically what an
optimal standard is in a given instance. While this is always true to
some degree with regard to social values, water quality management
poses some particularly difficult problems in securing data and
measuring values. Since values are finally measured through public
decision-making processes an effort to determine whether standards
reflect social preferences must evaluate, in effect, the process by
which the standard is established. No elaborate framework for
evaluating the standard-setting process has been developed for the
purposes of this paper. It has been simply assumed that (a) standards
should reflect the value preferences of those affected and (b) that
those affected (or their representatives) must be informed about the
consequences of alternative decisions. It is not a simple task to
determine in a given case, such as the one examined in this paper,
whether these criteria have or have not in fact been met. However,
3. For example, Kneese & Bower, supra note 1, at 131, assume that ". . . standards will be
based on some, usually vague, consideration of damage costs vs. costs of quality improvement."
Wm.J. Baumol and Wallace E. Oates assume the selection of standards poses no significant
problem. They state that "On the basis of evidence concerning the effects of unclean air on
health or of polluted water on fish life, one may, for example, decide that the sulfur-dioxide
content of the atmosphere in the city should not exceed x percent, or that the oxygen demand of
the foreign matter contained in a waterway should not exceed level y. . . . These acceptability
standards . . . then amount to a set of contraints that society places on its activities." Baumol
& Wallace, The Use of Standardsand Prices for Protection of the Environment, Swed. J. Econ.
(1971). Similarly A. Myrick Freeman III and Robert H. Haveman accept without questioning
the standard setting procedures of government agencies and direct their attention entirely to
how such standards might be achieved efficiently. See Freeman & Haveman, Residuals Charges
for Pollution Control:A Policy Evaluation, 177 Science 322-29 (1972).
4. This, of course, is what much of the criticism of United States water development
agencies has been about. They developed least-cost systems for achieving dubious objectivesl
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the case study seeks to assess the appropriateness of the standards
established in a particular instance by exploring:
(a) the extent to which the value preferences of those affected
were weighed and
(b) whether those involved in the decision processes made their
choices on the basis of the kind of information it is practicable to
generate as a foundation for intelligent decision-making.
In considering the kind of information that is important in establishing standards, it is assumed that cost and benefit information
expressed in monetary terms will be most useful. Where this cannot
be provided it is asssumed that data indicating physical and biological
consequences will be helpful since such information provides a basis
to which the decision-maker can apply his own value standards.
5
ESTABLISHING THE STANDARDS
The federal water pollution control legislation enacted in 1965
called for establishment of water quality standards for interstate
streams. Standards were to be developed by the state and subject to
approval by the Secretary of the Interior. In August 1966, legislation
became effective in the State of Wisconsin requiring the establishment of water quality standards in intrastate streams as well. 6 In
September, 1966 the Department of Resource Development of the
State of Wisconsin initiated action to establish standards on both
interstate and intrastate streams. This case study focuses upon the
process whereby standards were officially established in June 1968 for
the Wisconsin River, an intrastate stream.
The process of arriving at standards involved two major stages. In
the first stage, the water quality characteristics required to accommodate each of several different uses were determined. For this purpose
five classes of standards were established. These will not be described
in detail but they may be briefly defined as follows:7
1. Minimum standards. This is the lowest classification and is
designed to avoid nuisance conditions caused by heavily polluted
water.
2. Public water supply. This classification applies to surface waters
that are used as a source of public water supply. The standards are
specified in terms of coliform count, dissolved solids and pH. Also, the
water must be treatable to meet U.S. Public Health Service Drinking
5. Wible, Information for Establishing Water Quality Levels, 2 Water Resources Policy in
Wisconsin (U. Wis. Water Resources Center, 1971).
6. Wis. Stat. Ann. ch. 144 (Supp. 1972-73).
7. Adopted by the Resource Development Board Apr. 16, 1967, and published in the
Wisconsin Register May 1967.
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Water Standards and it must not contain constituents hazardous to
health.
3. Fish and other aquatic life. The standards are specified in terms
of dissolved oxygen, temperature, pH and substances toxic to fish and
other aquatic life. For trout waters, effluents should not adversely
affect trout populations.
4. Recreational use. The standard for this use is in terms of the
presence of fecal coliform and general coliform. A distinction is made
between "whole body contact" and "partial body contact" water
sports.
5. Industrial and cooling water use. The standard for this use is
specified in terms of dissolved oxygen (lower than for fish and aquatic
life), dissolved solids (higher than for drinking water), pH and
temperature. In general the standards for this use are less stringent
than for fishing uses.
The process by which the use standards were established is of
interest. It was viewed, as in most jurisdictions, as a technical matter.
Staff members of the State Department of Resource Development
consulted standard texts on such matters, the standards adopted in
other jurisdictions, and the United States Public Health Service
(USPHS) water pollution control standards published in 1953. A draft
of standards developed from these sources was circulated to other
state agencies having a direct interest in water quality and comments
were solicited thereon. A revised draft was produced to take into
account the comments received. Public hearings were later held on
the use standards as outlined above, and the category of use which it
was proposed should apply to each stream or section thereof in the
State.
Although public hearings were held on the use standards the
standards were defined in terms which virtually excluded everyone
from intelligent evaluation of them except those technically trained
or those capable of empl oying technical consultants. No one participating in the public hearing on the Wisconsin River (discussed below)
questioned the use standards. It is also noteworthy that the determination of use standards involves significant value judgements. It is not
true, for example, that coliform counts somewhat below the standards
specified for recreation use involve no risk to health or that counts
somewhat higher than the standard involve risks to health that are
necessarily greater than people are willing to tolerate. Later the
question of whether such value judgements must be made by
technically trained individuals will be examined.
The second stage in the process of arriving at water quality
standards involved a determination of what use designation (such as
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"recreation" or "public water supply") should apply to each section
of stream in the state. The State Board charged with the responsibility
for establishing policy and approving water quality standards announced that
It is . . . a goal of the standards to restore and maintain the
waters of the state as suitable for public water supply, whole body
contact recreation, and the reproduction of game fish and
minnows. It is the working objective of the Department to
achieve these goals within ten years. 8
In accord with the foregoing policy it was decided that all
Wisconsin water should meet the use standards for recreation and for
fish and aquatic life, except where a use permitting a lower standard
is specifically designated. The exceptions that might be made to the
recreation and fish and aquatic life standards would be for a
temporary period only, during which waste dischargers would be
expected to reduce or upgrade their effluents.
The announcement for the hearings on intrastate water quality
standard specified these policies and listed the reaches of a number
of rivers the Department proposed to except from the general
standards for recreation and fish and aquatic life and proposed the use
designations that would apply to these excepted reaches. 9 For the
mainstem of the Wisconsin River nine sections were to have use
designations permitting lower standards than uses involving whole
body contact recreation and fish and aquatic life.
The procedures whereby these exceptions were first proposed and
final use designations officially established may be briefly summarized
as follows:
1. Responsibility for determining what the proposed exceptions
should be was assigned to regional offices of the Department (The
relevant sections of the Wisconsin River were in Regions I and
IV). The regional offices based their determinations upon water
quality river surveys, consultation with a regional advisory board,
advice of interested parties, and advice of the central office in
Madison.
2. Hearings on the proposed use standards and stream designations were announced and widely advertised. At these hearings all
individuals who wished to speak were given an opportunity to be
heard.
3. Subsequent to the hearing there was consideration of the
8. As stated in the "Announcement of Public Hearings in Connection with Establishment of
Water Quality Standards and Water Use Classifications for Intrastate Surface Waters in
Wisconsin", Wis. Dept. of Natural Resources, Nov. 3, 1967.
9. Id.
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conclusions of the two regions with regard to the reach of the
Wisconsin River that flowed from Region IV into Region I. Each
regional office then submitted its recommendations to the central

office of the Department.
4. The Natural Resources Board of the State Department of
Natural Resources10 met and made its final determinations.
There are a number of aspects of this process that merit further
description.
First, 56 people attended the public hearing on the Wisconsin
River held in Wisconsin Rapids on November 20, 1967. Of this total
19 were representatives of the waste discharging industry, either
company or union representatives and 16 were associated with state
agencies, either as agency employees or members of the regional
advisory Board. There were present only three representatives of
conservation organizations, one representative of the League of
Women Voters and one unaffiliated citizen. The remainder were from
the news media, the power company, local municipalities, the federal
S.C.S. and two universities. This is not meant to imply that only
three representatives present held a conservation viewpoint. Yet, the
evidence suggests that a preponderant proportion of those present
were identified with the waste discharging interests.
Second, the presentations at the hearings were dominated by the
waste discharging interests. Twelve statements were made at the
hearing. One was an opening statement by the Chairman of the
Regional Advisory Board. Another was a description of the role of the
Wisconsin Valley Improvement Company which owns and operates
the reservoir system that regulates the flow of the river in the interest
of power production and industrial water supply. Three presentations
were made by representatives of unions whose members are employed by the industry. And the remaining seven were statements by
major dischargers (six from the pulp and paper industry). Union
representatives generally pleaded for consideration of the impact
upon the regional economy in setting the standards. The representatives of the waste discharging industries, with one exception, requested lower standards for specific reaches than those proposed. No
one spoke in behalf of higher standards than those proposed by the
Department.
Third, it is evident from the correspondence in the Department
files that, apart from its activity at the hearings, the waste discharging
10. During the time when standards were being established the natural resources activities
of the State of Wisconsin were being recognized. The Department of Resource Development
which initiated the process later became a division in a Department of Natural Resources and
the Resources Development Board became the Natural Resources Board.
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industry had considerable communication with departmental officials
before the hearings as the proposed use designations were being
determined and after the hearings before the final decisions were
reached. For example, on October 16 (prior to the hearing) the
regional director of Region IV wrote the central office describing
Advisory Board conclusions and included comments received from the
pulp and paper companies and the Wisconsin Valley Improvement
Company. On November 30 (after the hearing) Region IV Advisory
Board met. Present at this meeting were a number of representatives
from industrial water users. Eight of these spoke in behalf of pulp and
paper companies. Their statements were included as part of the
hearing record because they were presented within ten days of the
hearing. In January, when the negotiations between the two regions
were in process about the standards which should apply on the reach
of the river which flows from Region IV to Region I, Region IV sent
its recommendations to Region I and supported its proposals by two
statements made by pulp and paper company representatives at the
public hearings. During this period only one letter was received from
a conservation organization-the Sierra Club-and that was an inquiry
about the status of plans to establish intrastate standards.
In describing what occurred, it is not intended to imply that the
actions by waste dischargers were in any way unethical or inappropriate. Our sole purpose in summarizing the foregoing record is to
demonstrate that the waste dischargers had a much more active voice
in the processes by which the standards were established for the
Wisconsin River than any other non-governmental group.
TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE STANDARDS ESTABLISHED
Whether a given water quality is desirable is a subjective
judgement. However, it is practicable to make a technical determination of what in fact would happen to the water quality of the river if a
serious effort is made to attain water quality objectives for particular
reaches. In the case of the Wisconsin River an inter-disciplinary
research effort at the University of Wisconsin examined alternative
ways of achieving different water quality objectives." This study
provides an insight into the appropriateness of the standards adopted
by the State of Wisconsin for the Wisconsin River.
Chart I is a profile that indicates the dissolved oxygen standards
implied by the use designations finally adopted for the 180 miles of
the river most affected by industrial waste discharges. While this
chart does not reflect parameters other than dissolved oxygen it
11. Institutional Design for Water Quality Management: A Case Study of the Wisconsin
River Basin (U. Wis. Water Resources Center, 1970).
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indicates quite well the differences in the standards adopted. The
standard of zero dissolved oxygen in the upstream section reflects the
minimum standard for that reach which was adopted because of the
large volume of pulp and paper mill wastes discharged at Rhinelander. The standard of 2 mg/1 for alternate sections downstream
reflects a conclusion that in each of these sections it would be difficult
to achieve the 5 mg/I required by the fishing and aquatic life
standards because of industrial waste discharges.
The studies at the University of Wisconsin indicated that in a sense
the standards adopted were quite unrealistic. They showed in
particular that if the fishing and aquatic life standardswere met in the
reaches specified for such uses, all reaches would meet the fishing and
aquatic life standards. Chart I also indicates the dissolved oxygen
levels along the river if programs were implemented to achieve the
adopted standards.
Two other points emerge from the study which also have some
significance for the establishment of standards. One is that the fish and
aquatic life standards could be achieved at what would appear to be
relatively reasonable social costs. The study indicates that these
standards could be achieved at a cost between 0.8% and 1.7% of value
of the product of the waste discharging mills on the river. 12 The other
point is that standards or objectives should take into account a risk
factor. Because of variations in stream flow the cost of assuring the
realization of a specified standard increases dramatically as the risk of
violation becomes minimal. This result is illustrated by Table I.
In short it is evident that neither the state officials who proposed
the standards nor the waste dischargers (let alone the conservation
interests) understood at all well the implications of the standards that
were proposed and eventually adopted. If the waste dischargers were
in fact to be accommodated by lower standards, such standards would
TABLE I
Effect of Reducing Risk Level Upon Water Quality Management Costs*
Annual System Cost
Risk Level
($000)
50%
20%
10%
1%

3,611
3,930
4,467
5,276

*Other variables are kept constant and same standards are pursued in each case.
Source: From Table 5, page 84 of InstitutionalDesign for Water Quality Management: A Case
Study of the Wisconsin River Basin. Vol. I, University of Wisconsin, Water Resources
Center 1970.
12. Id. vol. 1, at 91.
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have needed to apply to most of the 180 miles depicted in Chart I. On
the other hand if the standards adopted were to be met, the lower
standards for some reaches were unnecessary. No one had the
information to arrive at standards in an intelligent fashion.
INTERPRETATION
Certainly this one case study does not tell us how to arrive at
environmental quality objectives that will achieve a socially optimal
result. However, it helps to establish the nature of the problem and
serves to substantiate what other experience and logical inference
would indicate one should expect. The issues it raises relate to (1) how
objectives or standards should be described so that they can be
communicated to those affected, (2) the role of environment quality
management planning in setting objectives and standards, and (3) the
measurement of value preferences of all elements of the public in
establishing objectives and standards.
A. Descriptionof Standards
The probable effects of pollutants upon public health or biota can
only be determined by an individual with specialized training. He can
say that a certain concentration of pollutants will destroy specified
species of fish or be very injurious to fish. Frequently, however, the
specialist is quite uncertain about the consequences of a given
concentration of pollutants and may only be able to say that since
high concentrations of a pollutant are toxic, lower concentrations
offer some risk. Thus when standards are specified as they were in
Wisconsin they mean little to the layman, because the terminology is
unfamiliar and they do not convey the fact that these standards are
based upon estimates of risk which cannot be objectively determined.
If we are in fact serious about providing the public with the
opportunity to express its preferences where value judgements are
involved it would appear essential that the mystery should be
removed from environmental quality standards and objectives. The
proposed standard for a toxic pollutant might well state "that x
concentration of the pollutant kills half the population of stickle-back
fish within 48 hours and while it is not known precisely what the
effects of lesser concentrations are, the proposed standards would
permit concentration of only 1/20x". The statement might go on to
say what an expert considers to be the risk associated with the
prosposed standards and/or what the nature of the uncertainty is with
regard to the standard. It seems only appropriate that the public
should know the basis of proposed water quality objectives and be
given the opportunity to consider whether the risks involved because
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of lack of knowledge about consequences are worth taking. The
specialist can define the risk or uncertainty but he has no particular
competence to decide what kinds of risks or uncertainties society
should accept.
B. Planning and the Establishmentof Environmental
Quality Objectives
This case study emphasizes the point that Matthew Holden has
made so well that pollution control involves bargaining among the
interested parties. 1 3 In this case the interested parties might be
crudely classified into three groups: (a) the State standard setting staff
(b) the waste discharging interests and (c) the other users of the river.
The particular contribution of this case study is that it demonstrates
that the bargaining process does not operate effectively when the
parties involved are uninformed about the consequences of alternative decisions. Neither the industry, the State nor the conservation
interests understood the behavior of the river well enough to estimate the practicality of alternative standards. These were knowledgeable individuals who had collected and reviewed data on the river
for many years but they had made no systematic effort to develop
predictive techniques. The industry succeeded in convincing the State
that nine reaches of the river should have lower standards than those
generally required in the state so as to reduce the burden upon the
industry of up-grading its waste discharges. But the industry had
misinterpreted its self-interest because if the State had insisted that
the industry meet the standards finally adopted, the entire river would
have met the higher standards and those interested in higher
standards than those adopted would have gotten more than they
expected. The Staff of the Department of Natural Resources considered modification of the standards in light of the finding of the
study. However, no action has been taken, possibly because of
impending federal legislation, eventually enacted as the amendments
of 1972 to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
The erroneous estimates of consequences made by the participants
in this case argue strongly for technical studies in advance of the
establishment of standards so that at least the behavior of the river is
understood. The Wisconsin River Project also indicates that studies of
the costs and returns associated with alternative sets of standards are
feasible and it is evident that such studies would enrich the
understanding of those involved in the decision-making process.
Illustrations of the kind of information that was developed are
13. M. Holden, Pollution Control as a Bargaining Process: An Essay on Regulatory
Decision-Making (Cornell U. Water Resources Center Publication No. 9, 1966).
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presented in the paper by Mr. Anthony H. J. Dorcey published in this
issue of the Natural Resources Journal. These data indicate system
costs under alternative constraints and risk factors. There is no doubt
that this kind of evaluation of alternatives could be extended. It is
significant that the union representatives who testified at the Wisconsin River hearing cited earlier were not pleading for a change in the
proposed standards. They expressed a concern about the possible
effects of the standards on the economic well-being of the union
membership. Information that could have been generated about the
economic consequence of the proposed standards would have helped
such individuals in deciding whether the proposed standard would in
fact adversely affect their interests.
This experience leads to the conclusion that instead of emphasizing
the establishment of standards it would be better to develop
alternative programs of water quality management. For each of these
alternative programs, it would be desirable to indicate where
treatment facilities would be provided, what reductions in waste
loadings would be required at specific locations, what the costs would
be and who would bear them, what water quality characteristics
would result, and what benefits would accrue to society from the
program. Even if such information could not be developed to a high
degree of accuracy, approximate estimates would, it is believed,
provide a basis for the interested groups to bargain more intelligently
about what should be done. Thus instead of arguing about whether an
abstract standard is desirable without knowing much about what the
costs, their incidence and the benefits would be, each of the interested
parties could bargain in light of reasonably good knowledge of
consequences.
It will be argued by some that accurate estimates of costs cannot be
determined because the costs of alternatives available to industry
cannot be known to public planning agencies. 14 This is true, but a
public agency can determine what it would cost a public agency to
deal with a given kind and quantity of waste. The more ingenious
agency will be able to estimate the costs of some of the options
available to industry. Preliminary programs based upon reliable cost
estimates that the public agency is capable of making provide a good
basis for negotiation. Such a program would indicate the amount and
location of waste reductions that would be necessary to achieve
specified levels of quality and the maximum cost of achieving such
levels. It is conceivable that the standard arrived at in this fashion
would be lower than would be justified if accurate cost estimates
14. It is generally accepted that approximate estimates of cost can be made. See, e.g.,
Freeman and Haveman, supra note 3, at 324.
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could be made of the option available to a waste discharging industry.
This certainly is a possible result. But in recognizing such a possibility
it is only reasonable to conclude that bargaining conducted on the
basis of this much information would come closer to achieving an
optimal standard than bargaining conducted on the basis of much less
information and that public agency personnel could, through access to
industrial literature and knowledge of the industry in the region, gain
an understanding of the options available to industry.
The Measurementof Value Preferences
The most perplexing problem posed by the case study relates to the
measurement of value preferences through administrative procedures.
Is it reasonable to conclude that the kind of procedure described
whereby standards were established by an administrative agency after
public expression of views can produce a socially optimal result?
Certainly no individual or group can be faulted for the way the
procedure was conducted in the case of the Wisconsin River. State
officials functioned in a conscientious fashion. Industry representatives
cannot be criticized for pressing their case in the hearings and on
other occasions because it is their responsibility to represent the
interests of their firms. The fact remains that while the industry view
was well articulated, other views were not expressed equally well.
This meant that the state administrative machinery had to bear
almost the full burden of reflecting the views of other members of
society. While the information may have been inadequate, there is no
positive evidence that the state agency did not weigh the available
information in accord with the social preferences of the people of the
State of Wisconsin. It is evident that it was necessary for the State to
arrive at its judgement on the basis of well articulated expressions of
interest by the industry and a weak expression of views by other
interests.
Mancur Olson and others have demonstrated that the kind of public
participation reflected in the Wisconsin River standard setting
processes is what one should expect. 15 The literature on public
regulation quite clearly indicates that one cannot rely upon an
administrative body to weigh the preferences of all interests in society
in the absence of active participation by those interests. 16 The full
range of public preferences may have been taken into account by the
Department of Natural Resources in arriving at standards for the
Wisconsin River but the literature on public regulation suggests that
15. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1963).
16. For an excellent empirical study of the limitations of regulatory processes see R. Noll,
Reforming Regulation (1971).
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such a condition cannot be expected to continue over an indefinite
period. Soon the regulatory agency tends to reflect the interests of the
regulated.
The answer to this problem is not self-evident and space does not
permit the exploration of alternative possibilities for dealing with it in
this paper. This case study does, however, help define the issues that
must be addressed.
It would appear from the Wisconsin River experience that one of
the fundamental questions is that of how to motivate public agencies
to generate information about the alternative water quality management programs that might be undertaken. Without such information,
no group can make an intelligent determination of where its
self-interest lies so that realistic bargaining can take place. The fact
that so little in the way of alternative regional water quality
management programs has been produced over the country leads one
to wonder what obstacles stand in the way of such activities. This case
study offers no answer to that question.
The other fundamental question is that of how to secure a balanced
reflection of preferences in selecting environmental quality objective
in view of the fact that the waste dischargers can generally invest
more time and energy in articulating their views than other interests.
One possible answer is that administrative procedures are inappropriate and that objectives or standards should finally be determined by
legislative bodies, possible at a regional level. An alternative possibility is to establish in one way or another advocacy bodies to
represent the less well organized interests. These alternatives pose
such a large array of problems and issues that it would be impracticable to explore them in this paper.
CONCLUSION
In view of the grand objectives and enormous effort to deal with
water pollution envisaged by the recent amendments to the Federal
Water Pollution Control legislation l7 the analysis in this paper may
seem irrelevant. Yet while that legislation relies to a large extent upon
effluent standards by specifying the technologies to be utilized it also
provides for the establishment of ambient water quality standards.
This study may be relevant to that aspect of the legislation. Of more
fundamental importance is whether this new legislation as it is
implemented will in fact reflect reasonably well a social optimum in
each and every waterway in the country. If it does not, there may be a
renewed interest in defining more precisely what constitutes the best
solutions to water quality problems. This case study, it is believed,
17. 43 U.S.C. §390G (1964), amending 33 U.S.C. §406et. seq. (1964).
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would provide some small contribution to such an endeavor..
Certainly it does not provide clear guidance to the solution of the
problem of establishing environmental quality objectives. Above all it
suggests that too litttle research effort has been devoted to the
examination of specific situations and too many generalizations may
have been based upon theoretical analysis alone.

